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3Income inequality has become mainstream. Chairman of the 
American Federal Reserve Board, Ben Bernanke (Bernanke, 
2007), lectures on the danger of growing inequality; there 
are  debates in the Financial Times; the two 2007 issues of the 
World Economic Outlook of the IMF deal with growing ine-
quality;  and many governments, at least in their public state-
ments at the UN, seem to be concerned with growing income 
inequality. Earlier, major UN organizations devoted their flag-
ship reports to income inequality (eg. UN 2006). These  were 
preceded by several research projects on inequality, notably 
those at  the United Nations World Institute for Development 
Economic Research, at the beginning of this decade.
Yet despite these growing public statements I fail to notice a 
groundswell of indignation or a coherent set of policies that 
take income inequality to heart. 
I would like to share with you today my growing concern with 
this and by reviewing various themes on income inequality see 
how we can strengthen academic analysis and debate to stem 
the growing tide of income inequality. I feel a bit humble in 
this respect, as various people in the audience share my con-
cern and have also taken up, in various ways,  the challenge 
posed by growing income inequality.
Trying to be a good academic I will first deal with the ques-
tion of what we are talking about: what do we mean by income 
inequality? Then I will discuss why, despite various critiques, it 
is remains important to focus on income inequality and which 
measures of income inequality are relevant. Then I will briefly 
review how we have arrived at this growing income inequality 
and discuss what we could possibly do about it.  The current 
situation is very much dominated by greater integration of 
various markets and splashes of technological development 
often called globalization. I will argue that globalization has 
influenced the functioning and outcome of various aspects of 
4the labour market and that greater attention to labour mar-
ket institutions and greater coherence between economic and 
labour market policies is a necessary condition to stem grow-
ing inequality.1
What do we mean with income inequality?
I will concentrate on reviewing growing income inequality 
at a national level: that is income inequality between people 
and households within countries. In the current climate of 
cosmopolitan thinking one could argue that one rather needs 
to be concerned with inequality on a world scale and  do away 
with the notion of national identity. And indeed many studies 
have shown that  inequality between nations has  increased, 
for example the ratio between the average income of the 20 
richest nations and the 20 poorest countries has risen from 
53 in 1960 to 121 in 2000 (WCDSG, 2004). But this  process has 
been accompanied by a growing inequality within most coun-
tries (Cornia 2004) and  policy making is mainly national: the 
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization 
(WCSDG) states that ‘globalization starts at home’ and argues 
that national policies can make a great difference. Paying 
attention to inequality at  the national level therefore remains 
important.2  This does not mean that no attention should be 
given to international inequality, as I have argued elsewhere. 
The classical economists paid attention mainly to the distribu-
tion of income between labour and capital  (factor income distri-
bution). This distinction drove the great classical debates for 
1  Some of the ideas developed here originate from various articles and book on 
income inequality I wrote earlier and which are listed in the references.
2 During the 1980’s and 1990’s income inequality before taxes and subsidies was 
more or less the same in Finland and the UK, rising in both countries; but while 
income inequality after taxes and subsidies rose in the UK, it declined in Finland! 
Atkinson 2004.
5many years. Less attention was given to this in the post war 
period as neoclassical production functions often assumed a 
constant capital share. However, for good reasons, attention 
to factor income distribution is coming back. I will say more 
on that later on.
After the Second World War attention shifted to personal 
income or household income distribution. One can interpret 
personal income in three ways. The first is income earned 
from whatever activities are undertaken (by some analysts 
termed primary income). Primary income is determined by 
markets and market institutions. The second interpretation 
of personal income is income after deduction of taxes and 
inclusion of transfer payments (sometimes called secondary 
income). Thirdly one can add to the secondary income the 
imputed benefits from public expenditure (sometimes labelled 
tertiary income). I am listing this not to complicate things but 
to be clear at to what we are talking about and also, as I will 
later argue, to discuss the need to review policy interventions. 
Most discussions focus on secondary income inequality and 
implicitly assume  that redistributive policies are equivalent 
to tax policies (and then argue that globalization is restrict-
ing national tax policies so that politicians nowadays have a 
reduced set of tools).
Why does it remain important to focus on 
income inequality?
Some argue that attention to income inequality is exaggerated 
as other aspects of life are equally or even more important: 
issues such as health, democratic participation, freedom etc. 
Often statistics are used to show that inequality of life expect-
ancy has declined or that increases in political rights have 
increased. 
6Very recently, the Commission on Sustainable Health, which 
looked into the challenges of the global health system, pub-
lished its report. The report had three overarching messages, 
the second of which was: ‘Tackle the inequitable distribution of 
power, money and resources – the structural drivers of those conditions 
of daily life - globally, nationally and locally.’ (WHO, 2008). So those 
who belittle the fact of growing income inequality will find 
little comfort in continuing to argue that we should look more 
at health inequalities, as the commission’s report argues that 
a major determinant of health inequality is income inequality! 
Mkandawire (2004)  has also argued that not all democracies 
necessarily pursue egalitarian polices.
Others argue that attention to income inequality is not neces-
sary as long as the economy is growing and poverty declining.3 
(This was actually one of the main tenants of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which concentrated on poverty 
reduction. Jolly (2007) and Vandemoortele are among those 
who have criticized the MDGs for focussing insufficiently on 
inequality.)
However there are moral  and economic reasons to be con-
cerned with inequality per se.  Cullity (2004) mentions four 
moral reasons:
Inequality as domination: imposing hardships on other 1. 
groups;
Inequality of political and legal status as a consequence of 2. 
income inequality;
3  This observation is actually based on an economic concept which was made 
famous by the Italian economist  Pareto, who argued that any outcome of a policy 
is optimal if at least one member of society sees his position improved by that 
policy. This so-called Pareto optimality has guided neoclassical policy making for 
a long time. 
7Inequality as callousness: when others cannot meet their 3. 
basic needs;
Brute inequality: inability of a society to include all groups 4. 
in welfare enhancement.
An economic reason to be concerned with income inequality 
is that research over the last one and half decades has shown 
that there need not to be a trade-off between equality and 
growth, or between inequality and efficiency.
From the 1950s and into the 1970s analytical emphasis was 
on probable trade-offs between growth and income distribu-
tion. This derived in part from Kuznetz’s famous ‘inverted-U 
hypothesis’ which postulated that inequality would rise in 
the initial phases of development, then decline after some 
crucial level was reached: hence policy action on reducing 
inequality would be unwarranted. Growth theories could be 
cited in support of the hypothesis, such as the Lewis model of 
‘economic development with unlimited supplies of labour’. 
Also Kaldor’s growth model, in which capitalists have higher 
marginal propensity to save than workers, implies that redis-
tribution of profits raises the growth rate. This, however, is 
of less relevance to developing countries (Aghion, Caroli and 
Garcia-Penalosa, 1999).
Focussing on the effects of inequality and growth, Cornia 
(2004) finds that there is a distinct non-linear relationship 
between initial income inequality and economic growth and 
argues that too low a level of inequality is bad for growth (free-
riding, high supervision costs), but also that too high levels of 
inequality can have serious negative consequences. Income 
inequality in most developing countries is currently in the 
high range. More recently, economists at the World Bank have 
taken up this point and make a distinction between deserved 
and undeserved income inequality or between good and bad 
8income inequality (Ferreirra, 2007). This distinction brings in 
too much unnecessary value judgement and the analytical 
approach of the non-linear approach is much preferred.
Birdsall (2005) argues that income inequality in developing 
countries matters for at least three instrumental reasons:
Where markets are underdeveloped, inequality inhibits • 
growth through economic mechanisms;
Where institutions of government are weak, inequal-• 
ity exacerbates the problem of creating and maintaining 
accountable government, increasing the probability of eco-
nomic and social policies that inhibit growth and poverty 
reduction;
Where social institutions are fragile, inequality further • 
discourages the civic and social life that underpins effec-
tive collective decision making that is necessary to the 
functioning of healthy societies.
There is thus a growing consensus that countries with an 
‘initial condition’ of a relatively egalitarian distribution of 
assets and income tend to grow faster than countries with 
high initial inequality. This is an extremely important conclu-
sion, because it means that reducing inequality strikes a double blow 
against poverty. On the one hand, a growth path characterised 
by greater equality at the margin directly benefits the poor in 
the short run. On the other hand, the resulting decrease in 
inequality creates in each period an ‘initial condition’ for the 
future that is growth enhancing. Thus, any growth path that 
reduces inequality reduces poverty through redistribution and 
via ‘trickle down’.
9Thus both on moral grounds as well as on analytical grounds 
the concern for income inequality and especially concern for 
growing income inequality is a proper concern.
Having established that concern for income inequality is justi-
fied, we have to face the question of how to measure income 
inequality. This discussion alone can keep economists busy at 
long congresses and I will not dwell on this, with the exception 
of one point which has become relevant and can have a direct 
consequence on policy making: a common measure used by 
many analysts is the so-called Gini ratio which on a scale of 0 
to 1 indicates the level of inequality. The index is constructed 
in such a way that it gives importance to how income is redis-
tributed around the middle incomes. But recently we have 
witnessed the phenomenon of growing inequality caused by 
top incomes (Atkinson 2007), which some argue may not be 
always covered sufficiently by the changes in the Gini ratio. 
Leigh (2007) however, making use of detailed data for 13 
developed countries, has found a strong and significant rela-
tionship between top income share and broader inequality 
measures such as the Gini ratio. Although it is not always cor-
rect to transpose research findings from developed countries 
to developing countries, there is some indication that more 
than average increases in top incomes can be indicative of an 
overall widening inequality and that general indices, as the 
Gini index, capture such rises in top incomes. 
However, one phenomenon that is not picked up by general inequality 
statistics is gender inequality. Elson (2007) and  Heintz  (2006) find 
that many factors are put forward to explain the gender gap 
in earnings – differences in education, shorter tenure in the 
labour market and interruptions in women’s employment his-
tories associated with raising children. Nevertheless, as Heintz 
reviews: a large quantity of research has shown that, even after 
controlling for education, age and job tenure, gender gaps in 
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remuneration remain. In part, this is due to the persistence of 
earnings gaps within occupational categories (Horton, 1999), 
suggesting that wage discrimination remains influential. 
Research also suggests that earnings differentials between 
men and women are also apparent across the various forms 
of informal work (Chen et al., 2005). However, Heintz argues 
that labour force segmentation is as important, if not more 
important, in determining the gap between women’s and 
men’s earnings. Women are disproportionately represented 
in lower paying forms of employment, often with fewer social 
protections and less stable incomes. Much less is known about 
the gender earnings gap in low-income countries, where infor-
mal forms of employment, including widespread non-wage 
employment, dominate. Also, the structure of production and 
responses to global integration can impact on changes in the 
gender income gap. For example, Seguino (2000) finds that 
capital mobility is one contributing factor to higher wage 
inequality in Taiwan. Since women are more concentrated in 
industries in which capital mobility is high, their bargaining 
power, and hence their wages, would fall relative to men as 
global integration progresses. 
How did income inequality develop over the last 
two decades?
Regarding income and earnings inequality in industrialized coun-
tries, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) observe that at any given 
time there are wide differences across modern countries in the 
level of earnings, and that nations with centralized bargaining 
(for example, Sweden and Germany) have greater equality than 
nations with less centralized bargaining (for example, the US 
and Canada). They also observe in almost all industrialized 
countries some increase in wage inequality among prime-aged 
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males during the 1980s. Wage inequality increased the most in 
the US and the UK and the least in the Nordic countries. The 
increased demand for skilled workers, coupled with differences 
among countries in the growth in the supply of skilled work-
ers, explains a large part of the differences. Furthermore (and 
important for policy making) they observe that institutional 
constraints on wage determination also seem to matter. The 
rise in relative unemployment rates among the least skilled 
in some, but not all, countries with centralized wage-setting 
institutions suggests that such institutional constraints were 
at least partially responsible for limiting the rise in inequality. 
For the US they explain the rapid rise in earnings inequality 
by reference to a variety of structural changes in the economy 
such as changes in industrial structure; more foreign trade; 
more immigration; skill-based technical change; and the 
weakening of labour market institutions such as minimum 
wage setting and unionization that limit the effects of the free 
market. They cite studies which confirm that the weakening of 
these two labour market institutions explain a large part, pos-
sibly even 50 per cent, of the increase in the dispersion in wage 
earnings in the US. Looking for common features and differ-
ences between the US and European countries, Gottschalk and 
Smeeding argue that differences in wage-setting institutions 
may well account for some of the differences in the growth in 
inequality: ‘There is certainly a prima facie case that countries 
with high union coverage on centralized wage setting were 
able to limit the growth in inequality’, they write (1997: 653).
Regarding developing countries, Cornia (2004) argues that the 
last two decades have witnessed a widespread and symmetric 
rise in within-country inequality in developing countries. There are 
three possible explanations for this. First, limited migration to 
advanced nations did not help in equalising the distribution of 
income in the countries of origin. Second, international finan-
cial flows have become less stable and more un-equalizing. And 
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third, inequality was also influenced in a non-negligible way 
by domestic policy and institutional reforms – such as those 
of the labour market, financial sector, tax reform – which may 
have been introduced to facilitate the international integra-
tion of poor countries but which had unfavourable effects on 
labour income compared to profit income and wage differen-
tials. Finally, Cornia argues, there are the inequality impacts 
of globalisation. These contradict the predictions of standard 
theory, which is unable to capture the effect of other factors 
such as domestic institutional weaknesses, the complexity 
of trade and finance in a multi-country multi-goods environ-
ment, persistent and rising protectionism in the North and the 
equity impact of other domestic reforms that are often intro-
duced to facilitate the drive towards globalisation.
I mentioned earlier the conventional wisdom that sees the 
labour share in GDP as relatively constant. Re search by Diwan 
(2001) and Harrison (2002), however, shows that the propor-
tion of GDP that goes into wages and other labour income is 
variable over time. Harrison shows that, in the group of poorer 
countries, labour’s share in national income fell on average by 
0.1 percentage points per year from 1960 to 1993. The decline 
in the labour share accelerated af ter 1993, to an average 
decline of 0.3 percentage points per year. In the richer sub-
group, the labour share grew by 0.2 per centage points before 
1993, but then fell rapidly by 0.4 percentage points per year. 
She tested for factors that could explain changes in labour 
shares. Changes in factor shares are primarily linked to chang-
es in capital/labour ratios. However, measures of globalization 
(such as capital controls or direct investment flows) also play a 
role. Exchange rate crises lead to declining labour shares, sug-
gesting that labour pays a dispropor tionately high price when 
there are large swings in exchange rates (ie., wages are more 
severely affected than GDP). Capital controls are associated 
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with an increase in the labour share, an effect that Harrison 
attributes to the weaker bargaining position of capital vis-à-vis 
labour if the cost of relocating production increases with capi-
tal controls.  The weak bargaining position of labour under 
open capital accounts is also a causal mechanism explored 
by Lee and Jayadev (2005). They found that financial openness 
exerted a downward pressure on the labour share both in 
developed and developing countries for the period from 1973-
1995.
Harrison also finds that increasing trade is associated with 
a fall in the labour share. This re sult is robust across various 
specifications of the regression analysis. These results point to 
a systematic negative relationship between various measures of 
globalization and the labour share. Similarly, Vos (2007) argues 
that it is also clear that trade liberalization is no panacea for 
poverty reduction. Average welfare gains are mostly small and 
in many instances have been inequality enhancing. The overall 
decline in the labour share is partly explained by what some 
call the ratchet effect: after an economic shock or a financial 
crisis the labour share in gross national income decreases but 
then in the phase of recovery  increases less quickly as GDP 
increases (van der Hoeven and Saget 2004). Some authors argue 
that the decline in labour share after economic shocks was, in 
effect, the consequence of a too high labour share before the 
crisis, thus partly blaming labour for the build-up of the crisis. 
However, only in a minority of cases have financial crises been 
caused by bidding up wages and labour shares. In most cases 
the cri sis was caused by external events or rent-seeking behav-
iour of capital owners. In a study of the manufacturing sector 
in a large sample of developing countries, Amsden and van der 
Hoeven (1996) argue that a decline in real wages and a fall in 
the wage share of value added in most non-Asian developing 
countries in the 1980s and the 1990’s reflect a redistribution 
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of income from labour to capital, as low wages were made to 
bear the burden of uncompetitive manufacturers.
As the former chief economist of the IMF, Kenneth Rogoff, 
observed when he returned to academia: The simple truth is that 
corporations represent capital, and capital – in the form of factories, 
equipment, machines, money, and even houses – has been the single 
biggest winner in the modern era of globalization. Corporate profits 
are bursting at the seams of investors’ expectations in virtually every 
corner of the world. ……………. Many policymakers seem to be under 
the impression that surging profits are a purely cyclical phenomenon, 
…..Wait a bit, they predict, and wages will fully catch up later in the 
cycle. Not likely. Capital’s piece of the pie has been getting bigger for 
more than 20 years, and the trend looks set to continue. ……Rogoff , 
2005.
Recent research by Daudey and Garcia Penalosa (2007) finds 
that factor distribution of incomes is an essential  and statis-
tically significant determinant of the personal distribution 
of income and that a larger labour share is associated with a 
lower Gini coefficient of personal incomes. 
How to react to the problem of growing income 
inequality?
We can distinguish 4 sets of reactions to growing income 
inequality:
The question is wrong, because we are misreading the • 
statistics, (as discussed earlier income is not important or 
we don’t pick up lower prices of electronics which lower 
income groups consume etc.).
Income inequality is indeed increasing, but it is not a prob-• 
lem. It is either a temporary phenomenon in the course of 
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development or an indication of the rewards of the current 
economic system.
Growing income inequality is indeed a problem, but espe-• 
cially with current globalization there is little one can 
do (TINA: There is no alternative). This argument is usu-
ally based on the assumption that national governments 
cannot increase taxes and transfers as this would effect 
international competitiveness or that governments in 
developing countries are incapable of dealing with income 
inequality.
Growing income inequality is a problem, but with politi-• 
cal will something can be done about it. Redistribution is 
necessary.
Weeks, Dagdeviren and myself have argued that implementing 
an agenda of redistribution involves major problems, but that 
these problems should not be exaggerated. In many develop-
ing countries such problems might prove no more intractable 
than the problems associated with implementation of other 
economic policies, such as structural adjustment policies. An 
effective orthodox monetary policy is difficult to implement if 
a country is too small or underdeveloped to have a bond mar-
ket. Similarly, replacing tariffs by a value added tax would be 
a daunting task in a country whose commerce was primarily 
through small traders. The international financial institutions 
have recognised these constraints to adjustment programmes, 
and they typically made the decision that constrained imple-
mentation of such adjustment programs was preferable to 
non-implementation. But the same argument can be made for 
a redistributive strategy: to achieve poverty reduction, it might be 
preferable to redistribute growth imperfectly than to implement the 
status quo imperfectly.
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Income inequality and labour markets
A recent study on explanations for growing inequality over 
the last decade (Angeles-Castro, 2006) concludes that high 
employment levels reduce inequality and, especially, high 
employment levels in the industrial sector reduce inequality. 
Targeting for employment and for reduction of income inequality  can 
thus be combined objectives in policy making.4
What is the role of labour market institutions in this? New 
insights have been recently provided by Freeman (2007), who 
concludes on the basis of an analysis of labour market institu-
tions in developing and developed countries, that these insti-
tutions reduce inequality but have modest, uncertain or time 
varying impacts on aggregate outcomes such as employment 
and other variables likely to be affected by wages.   
One reason, Freeman argues, why effects other than on ine-
quality may be modest, is that the political economy of insti-
tutional interventions rules out collective bargaining settle-
ments and regulations that are truly expensive to an economy. 
For example no country would impose a minimum wage that 
disemployed a large fraction of the work force; and no union 
or employer would sign a collective bargaining agreement that 
forced the firm to close.  Taking this line of thinking to its 
logical conclusion, Freeman argues that economies that rely on 
well-functioning labour market institutions may have reduced 
the transaction costs of bargaining and developed long-term 
4 Their results correspond well with the observations made above that part of grow-
ing inequality can be explained by the policies undertaken during the process of 
liberalization and adjustment, including policies to make the labour market more 
efficient in order for a country to grow faster. Van der Hoeven and Taylor, 2000, 
have argued that the notion of efficient labour markets in most adjustment pro-
grams was mainly based on considering the allocative efficiency of these markets, 
but that dynamic and redistributive efficiency were neglected during the adjust-
ment programs, leading to greater inequality.
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relations among parties such that they more often than not 
produce efficient outcomes per the Coase Theorem.  He con-
cludes that to help assess these interpretations and increase 
our knowledge of institutions, reducing inequality requires 
inputs from areas of research that have played little role in the 
debate over the link between labor institutions on aggregate 
outcomes and argues that one such area is experimental eco-
nomics. Evidence from laboratory experiments suggesting that 
people care about fair processes and outcomes and cooperate 
more than rational optimizing models of human behaviour 
suggest, opens the door for studies on the conditions needed 
for institutions to improve the market. 5
Freeman’s finding is very important because, if labour market 
institutions have as major objectives or outcomes a reduction 
of  inequality, and have varied effects on growth and employ-
ment, and if higher employment is contributing to lower 
inequality as argued above, then policies aimed at strengthen-
ing well-functioning labour market institutions and having 
an explicit goal of increasing employment will contribute to 
lower inequality. 
How can employment or redistributive targets 
make a difference? A few examples  
The first illustration is in the realm of macroeconomic policy. 
The World Bank has over the last five years become more 
5  A recent experiment is the so-called ultimatum game between two players, where 
the first player proposes to divide a cake or a sum of money in two, while the sec-
ond player, the receiver, can only take or leave the proposition by the first player. 
Economic theory would posit that the receiver accepts all offers of various divisions 
made by the first player since each offer is greater than zero. But experiments 
show that most people reject an offer that is below 20 percent of the initial cake 
and are thus arbiters of fairness. However, experiments with chimpanzees showed 
that chimpanzees acted more as a homo economicus than the homo sapiens (The 
Economist , October 6 , 2007).
18
concerned with growing inequality and has devoted various 
research publications to this. One example is Analyzing the 
Distributional Impacts of reform, A practitioners Guide Chapter 2 
on Monetary and Exchange rate reforms (Conway 2005). It 
opens with a reference to the so-called ‘policy trilemma’ of 
international eco nomic policies (see Mundell 1963; Cohen 
1993; Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor 2004). This states that 
na tional economic policy space is circumscribed by the impos-
sibility of pursuing the following three poli cies simultaneous-
ly: open capital account, fixed exchange rates, and independ-
ent monetary policy. The trilemma posits that only two out 
of these three policies can be combined. For example, under 
a system of an open capital account and fixed exchange rates, 
countries cannot pursue an in depend ent monetary policy, 
for example to stimulate employment growth, since interest 
rates are determined by world interest levels. Con versely, if 
countries need to undertake an independent monetary policy, 
they have either to revert to flexible exchange rates or opt 
for a closed capital account. The restriction of these options 
can hamper policies for full employment. The entire policy 
guide in the World Bank’s publication is based on this obser-
vation, ie. an acceptance of mainstream economic theory. Had 
there been an explicit objective to put employment creation 
and inequality reduction as a primary objective, however, 
this work could have probed much more into exploring new 
policy avenues: more recent research argues that the policy 
trilemma, which has guided policy makers for several decades, 
can be relaxed by avoiding the ultimate solutions referred to 
above and by looking beyond the traditional alternatives of 
fixed versus flexible exchange rates, or open versus closed 
capital accounts, to adopt intermediate options in these three 
policy domains – like a capital account man agement through 
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the selective application of capital controls, or a managed real 
exchange rate (see Bradford 2004).6 
Although capital controls have, much like any other policy 
instrument, not always been fully effective in reaching their 
stated objectives (see Ariyoshi and others 2000), they have con-
tributed to regaining greater policy autonomy in sev eral cases. 
In Chile, for example, controls im posed on inflows have helped 
to reduce their level and to change the composi tion of in flows 
towards longer maturities, hence increasing the autonomy 
of monetary pol icy (Gallego, Hernández and Schmidt-Hebbel 
1999; see also de Gregorio, Edwards and Valdés 2000). The 
more controversial issue is controls on out flows, but Edison 
and Reinhart (2001) argue that such controls enabled Malaysia 
to stabilize exchange rates and interest rates during the East 
Asian crisis and to gain more pol icy autonomy. Kaplan and 
Rodrik (2001) conclude that the Malaysian approach has led 
to a faster eco nomic recovery and to a smaller decline in real 
wages and employment than IMF policies would have done. 
How could a sys tem of a managed real exchange rate, the 
second element mentioned ear lier, stimulate employment? 
Rodrik (2003) and Frenkel (2004) provide three channels. Active 
management of the real ex change rate would allow for higher 
capacity utilization in times of unemployment, if applied in 
combination with the appropriate mix of macroeconomic 
and fiscal policies. It would also stimulate output growth 
and hence em ployment, if combined with appropri ate indus-
trial policies, as the experi ence in various Asian countries 
has shown. It could shift the sectoral composition of ex ports 
6  For example, in the case of China, research from the IMF argues that making the 
quasi-fixed exchange rate more flexible would allow the country to pursue a more 
inde pendent monetary pol icy. The same paper also argues for a cautious approach 
to capital account liberalization, given the institu tional weaknesses of China’s 
financial system (see Prasad, Rumbaugh and Wang 2005). The argument could be 
extended to many other developing coun tries. Rather than abandoning capital 
controls altogether, they should remain a policy tool that can be used se lectively.
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towards more labour inten sive goods, and hence increase the 
employ ment elasticity of the economy as a whole.
Employing a policy mix with intermediate options such as 
a managed capital account and a managed real exchange 
rate requires more fine-tuning and coher ence in policies 
rather than relying on rule-of-thumb policy interventions. This 
necessitates national institu tions with explicit mandates for 
employment and ca pabili ties to achieve this.
Another possible, supplementary, element to relax the policy 
trilemma would be to in clude one or two addi tional policy 
instruments to complement the fiscal and monetary tools (see 
also Tinbergen 1970 [1952]). Bradford (2004) sug gests, for exam-
ple, social pacts or coordinated wage bargaining to hold down 
inflation and so to “free up” other poli cies aimed at growth 
and employment creation. Also, a greater concern for inequity 
and a reduction of national inequalities could contribute to 
reducing inflationary pressure and could be added either as 
part of a social pact or as a stand-alone policy instrument 
(see van der Hoeven and Saget 2004). It is thus very important 
to have employment creation and equitable  distribution as 
explicit policy objectives for macro economic policies. 
A second example is that of considering central banks as agents 
of development as suggested by Epstein, 2007. He argues that 
an employment-targeting approach to central bank policy may 
seem quite alien to those schooled in the orthodox tradition 
of inflation targeting and financial liberalization, but that in 
fact this has been quite common historically in both currently 
developed and developing countries. Over the years, central 
banks have been seen as agents of economic development, not 
just agents of economic stabilization. And while sometimes 
central banks have failed quite spectacularly in this mission, 
there have been other important success stories, including 
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important periods in the US, UK, France, Germany, Japan, 
South Korea and India, to name just a few examples. 
As for developing countries, Amsden (2001 and 2007 ) describes 
the key role that investment banks played in the industriali-
zation success stories countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, Brazil, Argentina and others, in mobilizing and 
directing savings to key industrial sectors, and in particular to 
those specializing in exports. Epstein (2007) recalls that in many 
of these cases, central banks were a key part of the government 
apparatus that played a supporting role by maintaining low 
interest rates, maintaining capital controls to help stabilize 
exchange rates at competitive levels, and sometimes engaging 
in direct lending for preferred purposes. Engaging in these 
developmental roles, using a wide variety of instruments, was 
widely seen as a key part of the central bank’s mission. After 
the Second World War, there was a major trans-formation of 
central banking in the developing world. In many respects, 
these changes paralleled those in the developed world. Epstein 
deplores the resilience of inflation targeting and argues that 
inflation targeting  is far from benign as it creates in central 
banks a  culture  of inflation focus, or even inflation obsession.7 
An explicit employment target besides an inflation target 
could change the mindset of traditional economists.
A third  example is that of setting minimum wages. Several ILO 
studies (Saget 2001, 2008)  have observed that, as a consequence 
of structural adjustment and liberalization policies and a 
7 ‘Millions of dollars are spent studying every aspect of inflation, but few aspects of unemploy-
ment; thousands of hours of the time of highly scarce, skilled economists are spent pouring 
over complex models designed to show how to get inflation down from 8 to 4 per cent, but not 
on how to create more and better jobs; and if other government officials or those in civil soci-
ety ask the central bank to do something about employment creation, the central banks can 
respond, “that’s not our job”. More than anything else, the cost of inflation-focused monetary 
regimes is to divert the attention of the some of the most highly trained and skilled economists 
and policy makers in developing countries away from the tasks that previous generations of 
central bankers took for granted as being their main job: to help their countries develop, to 
create jobs, and to foster socially productive economic growth’. Epstein 2007.
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breaking down of trade unions and labour market institutions, 
the minimum wage in a sizeable number of countries is so low 
that it is does not contribute to reducing inequalities or pov-
erty reduction and has become meaningless. In a second set of 
countries, the minimum wages appears to fulfill its objective 
of reducing poverty without hampering employment creation.8 
But there is also a set of countries where the minimum wage 
is very high: too high in fact to be considered as a genuine 
minimum wage. This is the so-called “maxi minimum wage” 
(Saget 2008). Here often minimum wage legislation amounts to 
average wage fixation. Poorly developed collective bargaining 
is often a driving factor behind the emergence of such “maxi 
minimum wages”: minimum wage consultations are the only 
forum where trade unions can make their demands known, 
with the danger that the resulting minimum wage is not a 
genuine threshold, but rather the actual wage earned by most 
formal workers. In such a process, countries are actually trying 
to pursue multiple goals with a single policy instrument: the 
minimum wage is used as a reference to fix wages and incomes 
policies, to get a grip on inflation and to promote social dia-
logue. As is known from macroeconomic policy, one needs to 
have as many policy instruments as policy goals: the minimum 
wage-setting machinery is expected to respond to too many 
policy goals (Saget 2008) .
The interesting and policy-relevant conclusion is that both 
too low and too high minimum wages are an indication of 
malfunctioning labour markets. Well-functioning labour mar-
ket institutions would contribute to more relevant income 
inequality and poverty reducing minimum wages,  without 
 
8  It has been argued that the existence of minimum wages results in greater 
informal employment. ILO 1977 shows however that minimum wages up to 2/3 of 
the level of wages of unskilled workers will not produce substantial increases in 
informality.
23
jeopardizing employment and economic growth. If employ-
ment and fair distribution of income was set as an overarching 
policy goal, the credibility of such labour market institutions 
would have been strengthened.
Conclusion 
I asked the question whether one could make sense again of eco-
nomic policy in the light of growing inequalities. Based on what I 
have discussed, the answer to that question is no; or not yet. 
Economic policy needs to embedded, or more deeply embed-
ded, in a larger social construct which accepts equitable 
income distribution and employment creation as ultimate 
policy goals. Unless that has been fully accepted, one cannot 
yet make full sense of current economic policy. 
All this is perhaps utopian, but I slipped the word again into 
my initial question. Why? Because half a century ago Dutch 
economic policy was based on five objectives, all of them 
agreed in a social compact between workers, employers and 
governments of various political natures. These goals were: 
full employment; equitable income distribution; shared eco-
nomic growth; price stability; and a sustainable Balance of 
Payments. Not only in the Netherlands but also in various 
other West European countries, the period of the fifties and 
the sixties were characterised by rising employment, fairly 
equitable inequality and growth. Some analysts have labelled 
that period as the Golden Age: the willingness to set economic 
and social goals and to adhere to these goals contributed much 
to this. What is also remarkable is that a goal of achieving an 
equitable distribution of income was accepted, at a time when 
research on inequality and growth had not yet advanced as far 
as it has today and major research conclusions still pointed 
towards a trade-off between economic growth and reducing 
24
inequality. Yet, despite this assumed trade-off, maintaining 
an equitable distribution of income was accepted as one of the 
five basic  economic goals. 
A second example of a period in which countries grew fast and 
maintained a fairly equal distribution of incomes is the period 
1965 till 1980 when the so-called Asian tigers laid the basis for 
their extremely fast development trajectory. This was achieved 
through a combination of redistributive policies (land redis-
tribution and high investments in education) and of rapid 
but managed industrial development (Adelman 1979,Amsden 
2001).
Although these two examples of combining growth with equi-
table income distribution may at first instance look very dif-
ferent, they have, as Singh  (forthcoming) has observed, at least 
one element in common:  both are examples of restrained 
capitalism. In Europe the restraints came from social pacts 
and the functioning of the labour markets, while in the Asian 
tigers government bureaucrats and political elites provided 
the restraint. 
This juxtaposition of two experiences of growth with concern 
for equitable income inequality and the possible lessons to be 
drawn from this, provide a challenge that goes much beyond 
proper economic policy and requires a combination of various 
academic disciplines to deal with it. 
This is one of the reasons that I have gladly accepted to be 
engaged at the ISS, where there is an emphasis on academic 
rigour, dealing with development issues from different angles, 
and with a goal to be policy relevant at village, national and 
international level .9
9  This is a long tradition at ISS as van Niewenhuiize argued during the 25th anniver-
sary conference in 1977: As an academic institution that is in some way exceptional , the 
institute has to steer a middle course between the serenity and the intellectual integrity and 
independence of academia and the vulnerability of being an extensive arm of development 
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Another reason is that the question of income inequality has 
always played an important role in the ISS. For example, the 
25th anniversary volume (ISS,1979)  contains various analyses 
on inequality and redistribution, including Adelman’s theme 
of redistribution before growth, while the 50th year anniver-
sary volume has one third of its contributions devoted to 
Globalisation, Inequality and Poverty (Spoor 2004) .
I would therefore like to thank friends and colleagues or 
former colleagues at  the ISS like Rob Vos, Karel Jansen, Valpi 
Fitzgerald, Ruud Teekens, Louis Emmerij, Graham Pyatt, 
Bas de Gaay Fortmann, Nico Schrijver, Ashwani Saith, Marc 
Wuyts, and Jan Pronk with whom I collaborated or tried to 
collaborate on issues of inequality, basic needs and employ-
ment and Dutch development politics and who stimulated my 
thinking over a long time. More recently, especially for this 
current endeavor, I received tremendous support from Freek 
Schiphorst, Irene van Staveren, Mansoob Murshed and Louk 
de la Rive Box who were not only of great help in developing 
my ideas, but also helped me settling in at ISS. Without their 
advice and support I would probably not have been standing 
here today. I also learned a lot from Henk Thomas, in a certain 
way my predecessor in staff group 3, and from David Dunham 
who ably filled in my gaps of the history of the ISS. I look for-
ward to collaborating with you all as well as with many other 
colleagues, with whom I am starting to make acquaintance.
I am also glad that some of the international scholars I have 
been collaborating with have gladly accepted to participate in 
the seminar this morning and to be present at this inaugural 
address. They may not always have realized it, but collaborat-
ing with them was often a breath of fresh air for me, resisting 
policies. To exist and survive in the resulting field of tension is one of its salient characteris-
tics. It is also a matter that demands great care at all times (van Niewenhuijze 1977). 
26
the temptation - always looming when one works in a bureauc-
racy like I did for so many years - to rely on slogans, quick fixes 
and best practices. Thank you so much.
I would also like to thank the two generations of students 
for broadening my understanding of a world more complex 
than when I was a student.  I hope that I will be able to share 
with them the sense of critical analysis and the attitude of 
not taking anything for granted; approaches that I always 
received from my professors Cramer, Duisenberg, de Wolff and 
Zimmermann in Amsterdam and especially from my  promot-
ers Linnemann and Bos. 
But …I could not be here were it not because of the support and 
understanding of Marianne, Kees and Jorick. I was frequently 
literally in the air, traveling, and probably even more often 
with my head in the air, thinking out ideas. They have always 
supported that and, even more so, have always given me their 
useful opinions on world matters. A true treasure, to be cher-
ished. Thank you and Nos Iungit Felix Familia.
Rector of the Institute, in your invitation you wrote that this inaugural 
address is my formal acceptance of appointment. So here you have it 
…I will sincerely do my best to do justice to the expectations you, staff 
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